現(xiàn)代軍隊中偵察分隊的發(fā)展

ScoutsOut!

TheDevelopmentof

ReconnaissanceUnitsin

ModernArmies

JohnJ.McGrath

CombatStudiesInstitutePressUSArmyCombinedArmsCenterFort

Leavenworth,Kansas

ScoutsOut!

TheDevelopmentof

ReconnaissanceUnitsin

ModernAnnies

JohnJ.McGrath

CombatStudiesInstitutePress

USArmyCombinedArmsCenter

FortLeavenworth,Kansas

ThecoverphotowastakenbySSGJacobN.Baileyon2June2006ofSGTDavidBums

fromthe1stBrigadeCombatTeam,1stArmoredDivision,conductingacheckpoint

assessmentinTaiAfar,Iraq.

ScoutsOut!

TheDevelopmentof

ReconnaissanceUnits

inModernArmies

JohnJ.McGrath

CombatStudiesInstitutePressUSArmyCombined

ArmsCenterFortLeavenworth,Kansas

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData

McGrath,JohnJ.,1956-

Scoutsout!:thedevelopmentofreconnaissanceunitsinmodemarmies/JohnJ.

McGrath.

p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN

978-0-9801236-1-6

1.Scouting(Reconnaissance)—History—20thcentuiy.2.Military

reconnaissance-History—20thcentury.I.Title.

U220.M4332008355.4'130904--dc222008006375

CSIPresspublicationscoveravarietyofmilitaryhistorytopics.Theviewsexpressedin

thisCSIPresspublicationarethoseoftheauthor(s)and

notnecessarilythoseoftheDepartmentoftheArmyor

theDepartmentofDefense.AfulllistofCSIPress

publications,manyofthemavailablefordownloading,

canbefoundathttp://www.usacac.army.

mil/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp.

ThesealoftheCombatStudiesInstituteauthenticates

thisdocumentasan

officialpublicationoftheCSI.Itisprohibitedtouse

CSVsofficialsealonany

republicationofthismaterialwithoutthewritten

permissionoftheDirectorofCSI.

Foreword

TheCombatStudiesInstituteispleasedtopresentScoutsOut!The

DevelopmentofReconnaissanceUnitsinModernArmiesbyCSIhistorianJohnJ.

McGrath.ScoutsOutisawide-ranginghistoricalsurveyofthetheory,doctrine,

organization,andemploymentofreconnaissanceunitssincetheeraof

mechanizationintheearly20thcentury.

Reconnaissanceandcounterreconnaissancearebattlefieldmissionsasoldas

militaryhistoryitselfandmissionsforwhichmanyarmieshavecreated

specializedunitstoperform.Inmostcases,theseunitsweretrained,equipped,

anduseddifferentlyfromthemajorityofanarmy'sfightingunits.Horsecavaliy

performedthesemissionsforcenturies,forithadspeedandmobilityfarinexcess

ofmainbattleunits.Oncethehorsewasreplacedbymechanization,however,the

mobilityadvantageonceenjoyedbythehorsecavalrydisappeared.Sincetheearly

20thcentury,thesearchforthepropermixofequipment,theproperorganization,

andtheproperemploymentofreconnaissanceunitshasbedeviledarmiesaround

theworld.Thissurveyusesadiversevarietyofhistoricalcasestoillustratethe

enduringissuesthatsurroundtheequipping,organizing,andemploymentof

reconnaissanceunits.

Itseemsthatthesespecializedunitsareeithertooheavilyortoolightly

equippedandtoonarrowlyspecializedortooconventionallyorganized.Prewar

reconnaissancedoctrinestendtoundergosignificantchangeoncefightingbegins,

leadingtopostconflictanalysisthatreconnaissanceunitswere“misused“inone

wayoranother.McGrathendshisstudywithanintriguingconclusionaboutthe

rolethatspecializedreconnaissanceunitsshouldhaveinthefuturethatmay

surprisemanyreaders.

ScoutsOutisathought-provokinghistoricalstudythatwebelievewill

contributetotheArmy'scurrentandfuturetransformationefforts.Ifthisstudyof

thepaststimulatesthoughtamongtoday9sprofessionals,itwillhaveachievedits

purpose.CSI—ThePastIsPrologue!

TimothyR.ReeseColonel,ArmorDirector,

CombatStudiesInstituteUSArmyCombined

ArmsCenter

Acknowledgments

MypreTiousseveralworkswerequantitatileones.TmproudtosayIdidnot

turnonacalculatoroncewhilecompletingthisproject.Theworkisthe

completionofalongprocessthatbeganseveralyearsagoasaprojectassignedto

anotherhistorian.Whencircumstancespretenteditscompletionbythatperson,it

wasreassignedtome.Howeler,theneedsoftheserficedi]ertedmetoother

projectsbeforeIcouldreturntocompletetheresearchandwritinginthefallof

2007.Thisisanimportantsubject.Iha?efeltahistoricalstudyofreconnaissance

unitswaslongoTerduesinceitseemedintheUSArmythatsuchunitsfrequently

fluctuatedorganizationallybetweenwheeledandarmoredtehiclesonaregular

basis.Atthesametime,commandersinthefieldoftenusedsuchunitsasregular

combatunitsratherthanspecializedreconnaissanceelements.However,despite

thistrend,whentheAnnydeTiseditsnewmodularstructurestartingin2003,it

addedacalairysquadrontoeachbrigadewhileremotingalinemaneuver

battalion.Sincenohistoricalworksexistedanalyzingthelight-heatydebatewhile

lookingatoperationalemploymentofreconnaissanceunits,themodulardecision

wasnotmadebasedonhistoricalprecedent.Althoughthisworkcannotassist,in

retrospect,theformulationofthemodularconstruct,itshouldpro?idebackground

forfuturedecisionmakersifandwhentheissueofthe“misuse“ofcalairyunits

reappears.

Agraphics-intensiveworksuchasthistaxesthelimitsoftheeditorialand

layoutstaff.Theireffortswereextraordinaryandproducedanexcellentproduct.

Mrs.MarilynEdwardsproTidedyeomanserliceaseditorandlayoutspecialist.

Ms.RobinKern,whohaseditedordonegraphicsonmostofmypreviousworks,

againplayedakeyroleinthisproduct.CSIstaffmanagementpersonnel,Mr.

KendallGott,Dr.W.GlennRobertson,andCSIDirectorColonelTimothyReese

alsoplayedkeyrolesinthecreation,revision,andproduction.

SeTeraiotherinditidualsrequireacknowledgment.Mr.Da?idGoldmanofthe

USArmyCenterofMilitaryHistoryprotidedkeyresearchmaterials.Ms.Sharon

StreinoftheCombinedArmsResearchLibrarygreatlyassistedwithseTerai

importantinterlibraryloans.Finally,Dr.AlexanderBielakowski,Departmentof

MilitaryHistory,USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,beganthis

project,pro!idingadraftdocumentthatprotedhelpfulintheearlystages.

ThesoldiersoftheUnitedStatesArmyandtheotherarmedserfices,

aswellasallthecivilianandfamilysupportcomponents,requirespecific

acknowledgment.AswithalltheworksoftheCombatStudiesInstitutePressin

generalandmyworksinparticular,itishopedthatinsomesmall

waythisworkwillaugmenttheeffortsofthetroopsinthefield.

JohnJ.McGrathCombatStudiesInstituteUS

ArmyCombinedArmsCenterFort

LeaTenworth,Kansas

ti

Contents

Page

Forewordiii

Acknowledgmentsv

Figuresix

Key.to.Symbols.Used.in.This.Workxiii

Introduction.and.Background1

Definitions1

Pre-1914.Background2

Summary4

Chapter.1..The.Dcath.of.Cavalry:.Reconnaissance.Units.and.World.

War.17

Prewar.Organization.and.Theory

7

Equipment

……8

Organization

….…9

Tactical.Employment

….12

Tactical.Reconnaissance

13

Operational.Rcconnaissance

14

The.Opening.Campaign,.August.l914

14

Combat.Case.Study:.The.Battle.of.Hamipre,.20.August.l9

1416

Prelude.to.the.Battle:.Cavalry.Operations.in.Early.and.Mid

-August.191417

The.Advance.on.Hamipre.and.the.Opposing.Forces

22

The.Battle.of.Hamipre

29

Insights.From.the.Opcning.Battles

36

Reconnaissance.Operations.in.World.War.I.After.August.1

914……37

US.Anny.Reconnaissance.Units.in.World.War.I

40

Summary

42

2..Reconnaissance.Theory.and.Organization.in.the.

Interwar.Period49

Introduction49

The.American.Experience49

The.Air.Force.as.the.Anny^.Reconnaissance.Element49

The.Development.of.Mechanized.Cavalry51

Divisional.Reconnaissance.Elements55

The.German.Experience56

Doctrine.and.Theory56

Reconnaissance.and.the.Development.of.Panzer.and.

Motorized.Forces60

.Page

Reconnaissance.Troops.in.Other.Armies.in.the.Interwar.Pcriod64

The.British64

The.French67

The.Soviets69Summary

.70

Chapter.3

Reconnai

ssance.U

nits.in.W

orld.War.

II

...77

Introducti

on

77

The.Ger

man.Exp

erience.in

,World.W

ar.II

.77

General.

German.

Theory,.

Doctrine,

.and.Orga

nization...

77

The.Polis

h.and.Fre

nch.Cam

paigns一

Ardennes

.Redux

78

Later.Ger

man.Orga

nizational

,Develop

ments

88

The.American.Experience.in.World.War.il96

General96

The.Mechanized.Cavalry.Group98

The.Annored.Division104

The.Infantry.Division,.Regimental,.and.Separate.Battalion.

Reconnaissance.Units106

Marine.Coq?s.Reconnaissance.Units108

Summary109

The.Experiences.of.Other.Armies111

The.French111

The.British111

The.Soviets112

Summary113

Chapter.4...Reconnaissance.Units.and.Operations,.1945-2005123

Introduction123

Reconnaissance.and.the.Israeli.Defense.Force123

Reconnaissance.Unit.Organization.to.1973123

The.IDF.1973.Armored.Reconnaissance.Battalion.and.

Company129

Since.1973133

The.Soviet.Experience133

Organizational.Structure133

Operational.Employment136

Summary138

.Page

1

Reconnaissance.Units.in.European.Armies

The.British.Army

r1⑷

The.French.Army

The.German.Army142

Operational.Reconnaissance.Units1425

The.American.Experience,.1945-20055

Postwar.to.Vietnam,.1945-63145

The.Armored.Division,.1945-63147

The.Pentomic.Division148

149

Battalion-Level.Reconnaissance.Units

14⑸9

The.Armored.Cavalry.Regiment,.1948-63

US.Army.Rcconnaissance.Units,.1964-2003

Modular.Army,177

,182

Summary197

Conclusions197

Overview,198

The.Light.Versus.Heavy.Debate200

羽

The.Availability.of.Forces

Hybrid.Units

Echelonment202

Conclusion,203

The.Nature.of.Reconnaissance207

Glossary

Selected.Bibliography

Primary.Sources

Secondary.Sources

233

Appendix..Selective.Comparative.Reconnaissance.Platfbrms

About.the.Author253

Figures

Figure.1..The.echeloning.of.French.and.German.reconnaissance,

units,.191410

Figure.2..French.cuirassiers15

Figure.3..French.and.German.cavalry.maneuvers,.1-19.August.

191419

.PageFigure.4..

Situation.in.the.Ardennes,.19-20.August.l91423Figure.5..

Gennan.infantry.on.the.march24Figure.6..

Organization.of.the.French.9th.Cavalry.Division,.August.

191426Figure.7..

Ganization,.Battle.of.Hamipre,.20.August.

191428Figure.8..

Battle.of.Hamipre,.0900,.20.August.191429Figure.9..

Battle.of.Hamipre,.1100,.20.August.l91430

Figure.lO..Battle.of.Hamipre,.1230,.20.August.191431

Figure.11..Battle.of.Hamipre,.1530,.20.August.191433

Figure.12..Battle.of.Hamipre,.Dusk,.20.August.191434

Figure.13..Typical.air.observation.group,.AEF,.191841

Figure.14..Ml.(T4).medium.armored.car53

Figure.15..Proposed.German,infantry.division.reconnaissance

battalion,.192357

Figure.16..Gennan.light.division,.193959

Figure.17..German.infantry.division.reconnaissance

battalion,.193961

Figure.1S..The.SdKfz22/.light.armored.car62

Figure.19..Gennan.annored.reconnaissance.battalion,.193963

Figure.20..British.divisional.mechanized.cavalry.regiment,.193967

Figure.21..The.echeloning.of.German.and.French.reconnaissance..…

units,.194079

Figure.22..Operations.in.southern.Belgium,.!94082

Figurc.23..Guderian.(center).and.the.staff.of.thc.4th.Armored.

Reconnaissance.Battalion.(Lieutenants.Vbss

and.Munck.in.black.panzer.unifbnns.standing.

behind.Gmander.Major

Alexander.von.Scheele,to.his.left).at.Bouillon,

Belgium,.12.May.194086

Figure.24..The.German.armored.reconnaissance.battalion,.194489

Figure.25..Gennan.infantry.division.fusilier.battalion,.194495

Page

Figure.26..The.echeloning.of.German.and.American

reconnaissance.units,.194497

Figure.27..US.Army.mechanized.cavalry.group.in.World.War.il99

Figure.28..14th.Cavalry.Group.in.the.Losheim.Gap,.morning,

16.December.1944102

Figure.29..14th.Cavalry.Group.situation,.afternoon,.16.December

1944104

Figure.30..US.Army.armored.division.mechanized.cavahy.

reconnaissance.squadron,.1944105

Figure.31..US.Army.infantry.division.mechanized.cavalry,

reconnaissance,troop,.1942107

Figure.32..An.M8.armored.car.in.Paris,.August.1944110

Figure.33..The.Sinai.theater.of.operations,.1956.and.l967124

Figure.34..Israeli.AMX-13.1ight.tank126

Figure.35..IDF.643d.Reconnaissance.Company,.5.June.l967128

Figure.36..IDF.armored.reconnaissance.battalion,.l973130

Figure.37..IDF.87th.Armored.Reconnaissance.Battalion.in.the.l973..

Yom.Kippur.War131

Figure.38..Soviet.divisional.reconnaissance.battalion134

Figure.39..Spany135

Figure.40..Soviet.reconnaissance.vehicles:.the.PT-76.light

tank.(left),.BRDM-22.(nght)136

Figure41.Britishfirst-linearmoredreconnaissance

regiment,.1983139

Figure.42..British.reconnaissance.vehicles:.Scimitar.(left),

Scorpion.(right)140

Figure.43..French.reconnaissance.vehicles:.AMX-10.(left),

Panard.ERC-90.(right)141

Figure.44..German.reconnaissance.vehicles:.Fuchs.(left),

Luchs.(right)142

Figure.45..West.German.panzer.reconnaissance.battalion,.1985143

Figure.46..US.Army.light.tanks:.M3/M5.Stuart.(left),

.M4l.Walker.(right)146

Page

Figure.47..US.Army.armored.division.reconnaissance

battalion,.1948148

Figure.48..US.Army.armored.cavalry.regiment,.l948150

Figure.49..US.Army.ROAD.divisional.armored.cavalry

squadron,.1968153

Figure50.AnMl14vehicleinVietnamshowingitsdifficultywith

cross-country.mobility155Figure51.

M551SheridanfiringaShillelaghmissile156

Figure.52..A.troop.of.M48.tanks.and.ACAVs.in.Vietnam157

Figure.53..US.Army.AOE.armored.cavalry.regiment,.l988161

Figure.54..American.reconnaissance.vehicles:.M3.CFV.(left),...

HMMWV.(right)162

Figure.55..US.Army.light.cavalry.regiment,.l997164

Figure.56.J-series.divisional.cavalry.squadron,.armored.and.,

mechanized.division,.1987165

Figure.57..L-series.divisional.cavalry.squadron,.armored.and.

mechanized.division,.2003167

Figure.58..AOE.light.infantry.division.cavalry.squadron,.1997168

Figure.59..Cavalry.forces.in.Operation.DESERT.STORM,.1991172

Figure.60..Cavalry.units.in.Iraq,.March-April.2003176

Figure.61..SBCT.RSTA.squadron,.2003179

Figure.62..Modular.brigade.RSTA.squadron181

Figure.63..The.reconnaissance.paradox199

Figure.64..A.new.paradigm204

UnitTypeSymbols

Reconnaissance/Cavalry問Helicopter

ArmoredCavalryAerorifle

InfantryAttackHelicopter

MechanizedInfantry2Aeroscout

Tank/Armor西Fixed-WingAviation

StrykerReconnaissanceUAV

昌□

ArmoredCarSurveillance

口

口

MachineGunSignal

口

口FieldArtilleryAirDefenseArtillery

匚

口Antitank/TankDestroyerSupply

田

MortarMedical

日

EngineerMaintenance

Radar/SensorsCombinedArms

CombinedWithOtherSymbolsUnitSizeSymbols

|HeadquartersSquad■

Section??

口Platoon

Miscellaneous???

Troop/CompanyI

的

Squadron/BattalionII

Motorized

uRegiment/GroupIII

Motorcycle/BicycleBrigadeX

DivisionXX

口

□Airborne/ParatrooperCorpsXXX

AirAssault

Armored/Self-Propelled

KeytoSymbolsUsedinThisWork

IntroductionandBackground

Thisspecialstudyexaminesthedevelopment,role,andemployment

ofunitsinmodemanniesdesignedspecificallytoperfbnnreconnaissance

andsecurity(counterreconnaissance)missions.Theanalysisdiscernscommon

threadsfromthepast.Conclusionsaredrawnfromhistoricaltrendsthatmay

applytofutureforcedevelopmentplanningandunitoperationalemployment.

Inthepast,dedicatedreconnaissanceunitswereuniqueintheirorganization

andcapabilitiesduetothepresenceofthehorse.Thisprovidedcavalrywitha

markedmobilitydifferentialoverinfantryandartillery.Inthemechanizedage,

thismonopolyonmobilityvanished.Nonreconnaissancemechanizedand

motorizedforceswereequippedwithsimilarweaponsandvehicles.

Reconnaissanceunitsthenbecamedistinctiveprimarilybytheirorganizational

structureandspecializedmissionratherthanbytheirequipment.

Thisconceptualtransformationhascreatedagreatdichotomyformodern

reconnaissanceforces.Shouldsuchforcesbelightorheavy?Alighterforcemight

beabletoconductreconnaissanceoperations,atleasttheoretically,inamore

nimblefashion,whileaheavierforcecoulddefenditselfwhenconducting

reconnaissanceandsecurityoperations.Anadditionalconsiderationisthe

questionastowhatorganizationallevelshoulddedicatedreconnaissanceforcesbe

providedandused.Thisworkexaminesthesetwomajorthreadsfromahistorical

perspectivesinceWorldWarI.

Definitions

Followingthedevelopmentofgunpowder,butbeforethedevelopmentof

industrialageweaponry,reconnaissanceandsecurityactivitiesattheoperational

andstrategiclevelswereprimarilytheresponsibilityofhorsecavalryforces.At

thetacticallevel,suchreconnaissancewasgenerallyaunitresponsibility.After

thedevelopmentofindustrialagetechnologyandthedeclineofhorsecavalry,

modemarmieshavedeployedvariousunitsconfiguredanddedicatedto

conductingreconnaissanceandsecuritymissionsatboththeoperationaland

tacticallevels.Apartfromthis,manyotherformerrolesofhorsecavalry(and

someinfantry)havebeentakenoverbymechanizedcombinedarmsteamsbuilt

aroundthetank.Particularamongtheseareoffensivecombat,pursuit,and

exploitation.

TheWorldWarIIUSArmydefinedreconnaissanceas“thedirectedeffortin

thefieldtogathertheinformationoftheenemy,terrainorresources[to]gainthe

informationuponwhichtobasetacticalorstrategicoperations.^^Inturn,

counterreconnaissancewasdefinedinthesameperiodasthemeasures“toscreen

acommandfromhostileobservation.,,iBeforetheendofWorldWarII,thetenn

“cavalry“usedinthisworkreferstohorsecavalry;duringWorldWarII,theterm

"mechanizedcavalry“isusedforUSArmyreconnaissanceunits;andafterWorld

WarII,theterms"armoredcavalry^^and“aircavalry^^aremostcommonlyusedin

theUSArmy.However,sincetheadoptionoftheArmyofExcellence

organizationalstructureinthemid-1980s,theunmodifiedtermcavalryhas

reappearedtodesignatethedivisionreconnaissanceunitthatconsistedofa

combinationorvariationofgroundhelicopterunitsandthegroundunitsequipped

witharmoredorwheeledvehicles.Therefore,theuseofthetermcavalryinthat

contextdoesnotrefertoaunitequippedwithhorses.

Variousarmieshaveechelonedtheconductofreconnaissanceintoseveral

levels.Inthisspecialstudy,groundreconnaissanceoperationsaredividedinto

twolevels,operationalandtactical.Operationalreconnaissance,sometimes

referredtoasstrategicreconnaissanceinolderworks,isthatinformation

developedbylargeunitsatcorpslevelandabove,operatingatadistancefromthe

supportedforceaboutthedispositionsandmovementsoftheenemy'slargeunits.

Tacticalreconnaissance,sometimesdividedintotacticalandcloseorcombat

intelligenceinolderworks,isthatreconnaissanceconductedbylowerunitsto

identifytheenemyforcesarrayedagainstthem,eitherincontactorcloseenough

tobeincontactonshortnotice.Foreachhistoricaleraexaminedinthiswork,

bothoperationalandtacticallevelsareexaminedbyorganizationandemployment

ofdedicatedreconnaissanceorganizationsateachlevel.

Pre-1914Background

BeforeWorldWarI,horsecavalry,alongwithartilleryandinfantry,wasone

ofthethreebasiccombatarmsfoundinlandforces.Cavalry'sroleinthistriad

wasthelightlyequippedbuthighlymobileportionofthecombinedarmsforce.It

wasbasicallyan“allpurpose,mobilecombatforce.”"Whileconsideredassuch,

cavalrygenerallywasusedforcertainspecificrolesattheoperationallevel.It

guardedtheflanksofadvancingandretreatingforcesandgenerallyprovided

reconnaissanceandsecurityforbrigade-sizedforcesorlarger.Cavalryalsokept

theenemycavalryatbayandprovidedarmycommanderswithamobilereserve

withwhichtheycouldpresenttheshockactionofamountedattackasacoupde

graceagainstashatteredenemyarmyandexploitationofoperationalsuccessin

pursuitofretreatingenemyforces.

I

Horsecavalryforceshadspecificcharacteristicsthatshapedtheirroleand

employment.Suchunitsrequiredmorelogisticalsupportthaninfantryforces,

includingtheneedforforagefortheanimalsandreplacementanimalsas

necessary.Inmostarmies,suchassetswerelimited,andcommandershusbanded

themaccordingly,oftenretainingthecavalryathigherlevelsinconsolidated

units.

Beforethemid-T800s,horseunitstypicallyfoughtmountedusingsabers,

pikes,lances,andrapid-firingcarbines.Unitssoequippedcouldmountacharge

fasterthandefendinginfantrycouldfireenoughvolleysattheadvancingcavalry

toweakenittothepointwheretheshockeffectofthechargewouldbeneutralized.

Insuchcases,infantryhadtouseamaneuverinwhichitformedacomplete

squareformationwitharowofriflemencrouchedwithbayonetsstickingupinthe

air.Thebayonetshadtheeffectofstoppingtheadvanceofthehorses.Theutility

ofthesquaremeantcavalrywasusuallynotusedagainstlineinfantryunlessthe

latterhadalreadybeenbrokenandwasinretreat.

Technology,intheformofrifledmusketswithfasterratesoffire,

meantthat,bythetimeoftheAmericanCivilWar,mountedcavalrycould

notfacethetirepoweroflineinfantryunderalmosteverycircumstance.

Consequently,commandersrarelyplacedtheircavalryinapositionwhere

ithadtoattacklineinfantry.Onthedefensive,cavalryfightingdismounted

wasoftenusedtemporarilyagainstadvancinginfantrytoprovidesecurity

foramaindefendingforcetocoveraflankortodelayanenemyadvance

untilthearrivalofinfantry.Insuchinstances,thehorsemenhadseveraldistinct

disadvantages.Acertainnumberofmenhadtoberetainedtoholdthereinsofthe

horses,makingunitsproportionallysmaller.Additionally,

firearmsusedbythecavalry,whilecapableofrelativelyrapidfire,were

alsoshortranged.Exceptinunusualcircumstances,dismountedcavalrycouldnot

standuptolineinfantryandwasnotexpectedtodoso.

Horsecavalrypossessedamobilitynotfoundininfantryandartilleryunits.

Thismobilityallowedcavalryforcestomoveoperationallyandtacticallyaround

thebattlefieldandareaofoperationstogatherinformationonenemydispositions

andtheterrain.Cavalryalsohadtheresponsibilityofdenyingsuchinformationto

theenemy.Therefore,withthecavalryonbothsidesbeingsimilarlyill-equipped

tofaceinfantry,thecavalryforcesofopposingsidesoftenendedupfightingeach

other.Neutralizingtheenemycavalry,therefore,becamethedefactomain

missionforcavalryforces.

CavalryorganizationwassomewhatmoreflexibleintheCivilWar

eraUSArmythanwasthatoftheinfantry.Unliketheinfantryregiment,which

wassubdivi