2024全球宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測(cè)：困難時(shí)期已經(jīng)過(guò)去（英）

Note:ThefollowingisaredactedversionoftheoriginalreportpublishedNovember

8,2023

[28

pgs].8November2023|11:01AMESTGlobal

Economics

AnalystMacroOutlook2024:TheHardPartIsOvernThe

globaleconomyhasoutperformedeven

ouroptimisticexpectationsin2023.GDPgrowthisontrack

tobeatconsensusforecastsfromayearagoby

1ppgloballyand2ppintheUS,

whilecorein?ationisdownfrom6%in2022to3%sequentiallyacrosseconomiesthatsaw

apost-covidpricesurge.JanHatzius+1(212)902-0394|jan.hatzius@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCDominicWilson+1(212)902-5924|dominic.wilson@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCnnMoredisin?ationisinstoreover

thenextyear.

Althoughthenormalizationinproductandlabormarketsisnow

welladvanced,itsfulldisin?ationaryeffect

isstillplayingout,andcorein?ationshouldfallback

to2-2?%by

end-2024.JosephBriggs+1(212)902-2163|joseph.briggs@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCVickieChang+1(212)902-6915|vickie.chang@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCWe

continuetoseeonlylimitedrecessionriskandreaf?rmour15%

USrecessionprobability.

We

expectseveraltailwindstoglobalgrowthin2024,includingstrongrealhouseholdincomegrowth,asmallerdragfrommonetaryand?scaltightening,arecoveryinmanufacturingactivity,andanincreasedwillingnessofcentralbankstodeliverinsurancecutsifgrowthslows.DeveshKodnani+1(917)343-9216|devesh.kodnani@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCGiovanniPierdomenico+44(20)7051-6807|giovanni.pierdomenico@GoldmanSachsInternationalnnnMostmajorDMcentralbanksarelikely?nishedhiking,butunderourbaselineforecastfor

astrongglobaleconomy,

ratecutsprobablywon’t

arriveuntil2024H2.

Whenratesultimatelydosettle,we

expectcentralbankstoleavepolicyratesabove

theircurrentestimatesoflong-runsustainablelevels.The

BankofJapanwilllikelystartmovingtoexityieldcurvecontrolinthespringbeforeformallyexitingandraisingratesin2024H2,assumingin?ationremainsontrack

toexceedits2%target.

Near-term

growthinChinashouldbene?t

fromfurtherpolicystimulus,butChina’s

multi-yearslowdownwilllikelycontinue.The

marketoutlookiscomplicatedby

compressedriskpremiaandmarketsthatarequitewellpricedfor

ourcentralcase.

We

expectreturnsinrates,credit,equities,andcommoditiestoexceedcashin2024underourbaselineforecast.Each

offers

protectionagainstadifferent

tailrisk,soabalancedassetmixshouldreplace2023’s

cashfocus,withagreaterrolefor

durationinportfolios.nThe

transitiontoahigherinterestrateenvironmenthasbeenbumpy,

butinvestorsnow

facetheprospectofmuch

better

forwardreturnson?xedincomeassets.

The

bigquestioniswhetherareturntothepre-GFCratebackdropisanequilibrium.

The

answerismorelikelytobeyes

intheUSthanelsewhere,especiallyinEuropewheresovereignstressmightreemerge.

WithoutaclearchallengertotheUSgrowthstory,thedollarislikelytoremainstrong.Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.For

Reg

ACcerti?cationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosure

Appendix,orgoto/research/hedge.html.GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystMacroOutlook2024:TheHardPartIsOverThe

globaleconomyhasoutperformedeven

ouroptimisticexpectationsin2023.

AsExhibit

1shows,we

now

estimatethatglobalGDPwillgrow2.7%thisyear,

1ppabovetheBloombergconsensusforecastofayearago.

The

UnitedStatesisontrack

forgrowthof2.4%,afull2ppabove

theconsensusforecastofayearago.

The

surpriseselsewherearegenerallysmaller,

butwe

doexpectbeatsin88%oftheeconomiesunderourcoverageonaGDP-weightedbasis.Exhibit

1:

Growth

Has

Outperformed

Our

Optimistic

Expectations

in

2023Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchSolidGDPgrowthhastranslatedintomore-than-solidlabormarketperformance.

Exhibit2showsthattheunemploymentrateacrossalleconomiesunderourcoveragethatproducehigh-qualitylabormarketdatacontinuedtoedgedownin2022-2023andnowstandsabout?ppbelowitspre-pandemiclevel.

Importantly,thisimprovementisvisibleeveninsomekeyeconomiesthathaveseenverylowrealGDPgrowth,suchastheEuroarea.8November20232GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystExhibit

2:

Unemployment

Has

Settled

Below

Pre-Pandemic

LevelsSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThesepositivesurprisescamedespiteseveralunexpectednegativeshocks.

First,bothshort-termandlong-terminterestratesrosesigni?cantlyfurtherthanimpliedby

marketpricing—partlyduetobetter-than-expected

growthdatabutalsopartlyduetomorehawkishcentralbankreactionfunctions,atleastearlyintheyear.

Second,therewasabriefbutseriousboutofbankingsectorinstabilityintheUSandEuropeduringthespring.

Andthird,theIsrael-Hamaswar

isasoberingreminderofthegrowingsecurityrisksfacingtheworldorder,

althoughsofar

ithasnothadamajorimpactonoilprices,?nancialmarkets,ortherealeconomyoutsidetheMiddleEast.Butinanimportantway,

even

theseobservationsstillunderstatetheamountofgoodnewsthat2023hasdelivered.

Notonlyhave

growthandemploymentsurprisedtotheupsideinthefaceofseveralnegativeshocks,butallthishasoccurredalongsidemuchlower

in?ationacrossalleconomiesthatsaw

alargeandunwantedpost-pandemicpricesurgein2021-2022.To

demonstratethesizeoftheimprovement,Exhibit

3plotstheaveragecoreCPIin?ationrateofallG10

economiesminusJapan(wherehigherin?ationwasdesired)plustheEM

“early

hiker”economiesthatexperiencedthebiggestin?ationsurgesandthusdeliveredthemostaggressivemonetarypolicytightening.

Sincetheendof2022,sequentialcorein?ationinthisgroupofeconomieshasfallenfrom6%to3%sequentially.

Centralbankshave

thereforeachieved

morethanthree-quartersoftheadjustmentneededtogetin?ationback

totheirtargets.8November20233GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystExhibit

3:

A

Sharp

Drop

in

Core

In?ation

Across

the

Economies

That

Saw

a

Post-Pandemic

SurgeSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchTheimprovementiswidespreadacrosseconomies.

Exhibit

4showsthateveryeconomyinourgroupofG10

andEMeconomieshasseenaverymeaningful—andinmostcasesdramatic—in?ationdeclinefromthepeak.Exhibit

4:

Core

In?ation

Has

Declined

Very

Meaningfully

EverywhereSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThe

improvementisalsobroadacrosspriceindexcomponents.

Exhibit

5showsthattherighttailofthedistributionofpricechanges(which

capturesbigpriceincreases)hasshiftedpartwayback

towarditspre-pandemicposition,althoughithasnotfullynormalizedbecauseof

“catch-up”movesinlaggingareaswherepricesaresetrelativelyinfrequently(e.g.,healthcareandinsurance).

Bycontrast,thelefttailofthedistribution(outrightpricedeclines)hasremainedstablethroughoutthisepisode.

ThismeansthatthedropinpricesofitemssuchasenergyorUSusedcarsoverthepastyearisthe8November20234GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystexception,andthatare-anchoringoflow

andstablein?ationinmoreregularexpendituressuch

asrestaurantmealsorhouseholdproductsisthemoredominantreasonfor

theimprovement.Exhibit

5:

In?ation

Is

Falling

Because

the

Right

Tailof

Price

Increases

Is

NormalizingSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch8November20235GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystThe

Last

MileWe

don’t

thinkthelastmileofdisin?ationwillbeparticularlyhard.

First,althoughtheimprovementinthesupply-demandbalanceinthegoodssector—measuredfor

exampleby

supplierdeliverylags—isnow

largelycomplete,theimpactoncoregoodsdisin?ationisstillunfoldingandwilllikelycontinuethroughmostof2024(Exhibit

6).Exhibit

6:

Goods

Disin?ation

Still

Has

Further

to

RunSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchSecond,shelterin?ationhasconsiderablyfurthertofall.

ThisistrueacrossDMeconomies,althoughthesizeoftheimpactissmallerintheEuroareaandtheUKwhereowner-occupied

housingisexcludedfromthekey

in?ationmeasures(Exhibit

7).Exhibit

7:

Shelter

Cost

In?ation

Has

Further

to

FallSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThird,andmostimportantly,thesupply-demandbalanceinthelabormarketcontinuestoimprove,asshowninExhibit

8.

Theleftchartshowsthatourjobs-workersgap—8November20236GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystmeasuredasjobopeningsminusunemployedworkers—istrendingdowneverywhere.Intheory,thisimprovementcouldoccurinabenignway

viaadeclineinjobopeningsorinamoreperniciousway

viaanincreaseinunemployment.

Inpractice,theadjustmenthassofar

occurredalmostentirelyinabenignfashion,asjobopeningshave

declinedwithoutariseinunemployment—orinmoretechnicalparlance,the

“Beveridgecurve”hasshiftedbackmostofthewaytoitspre-pandemicposition,asshownintherightchart.

Weexpectincrementalrebalancingtoremainmostlypainless,asjobopeningratesremainelevatedrelativetolevelsimpliedbyeconomicfundamentals(andthushave

roomtonormalizefurther)inmostmajoreconomies,andafullreversaltopre-pandemiclevelsisprobablynotrequiredgiventhatin?ationundershotcentralbanktargetsduringthatperiod.Exhibit

8:

The

Labor

Market

Is

Easing

as

Job

Openings

Fall

Without

Higher

UnemploymentSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchInlightofthisimprovementandthesharpdeclineinheadlinein?ation,itisnotsurprisingthatnominalwagegrowthhasstartedtoslowmeaningfullybacktowardtarget-consistentlevels(Exhibit

9).

Together

withgenerallyanchoredin?ationexpectations,thissuggeststhatsigni?cantsecond-roundeffectsfromtheearlierin?ationsurgeareunlikely.8November20237GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystExhibit

9:

Sequential

Wage

Growth

Is

Slowing

EverywhereSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThe

upshotfromthisdiscussionisthatlastyear’s

disin?ationdoesindeedhave

furthertorun.

OnaverageacrosstheG10

ex.

JapanandtheEMearlyhikers,we

expectaslowdowninsequentialcorein?ationfrom3%now

tothe2-2?%rangethatwouldbebroadlyconsistentwiththein?ationtargetsofmostDMcentralbanksby

theendof2024(Exhibit

10).

Ifanything,we

thinkthattheriskstotheachievementoftarget-consistentin?ationareontheearlierside.Exhibit

10:

Core

In?ation

Should

Cool

to

Broadly

Target-Consistent

Levels

by

End-2024GS

Core

Inflation

ForecastsPercent,

year

ago7Major

DMsPercent,

year

ago

Percent,

year

agoAggregateof

G10ex.JapanandEMEarlyHikers*Percent,

year

ago77654321076543210US(PCE)EuroAreaUK65432106543210CanadaAustralia2019202020212022202320242025202620192020202120222023202420252026Note:Dashed

linesindicateGSforecasts.*We

showearlyhikerswithstandingcoreinflation

forecasts,

including

theCzechRepublic,Hungary,Mexico,Poland,

andRomania.

Dashed

linesindicateGSforecasts.Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch8November20238GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystThere’s

Just

No

Need

for

a

RecessionDespitethegoodnewsongrowthandin?ationin2023,concernsaboutarecessionamongforecastershaven’t

declinedmuch.

EvenintheUS,

which

hasoutperformedsoclearlyongrowthinthepastyear,

Exhibit

11

showsthatthemedianforecasterstillestimatesaprobabilityofaround50%thatarecessionwillstartinthenext12

months.1Thisisdownonlymodestlyfromthe65%probabilityseeninlate2022andfar

aboveourown

probabilityof15%

(which

inturnisdownfrom35%inlate2022).Exhibit

11:

WeHave

Become

More

Con?dent

That

the

US

Economy

Will

Avoid

RecessionPercent100US

12-Month

Ahead

Recession

ProbabilityGS

Bloomberg

ConsensusPercent100April2022:LaunchedGSTracking

at15%September

2023:Lowered

to

15%onContinuedPositiveLaborMarketandInflation

NewsMarch2023:Raisedto

35%onBankingStresctober2022:Raisedto

35%onHawkish

FedJune

2023:Lowered

to

25%June2022:Raised

to30%onHigherFebruary2023:July

2023:Loweredto20%onDisinflationProgressLoweredto25%

onReceding

DebtonLabor

Market

Limit

andBankingInflationAdjustmentRisksMar-22Jun-22Sep-22Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchMorebroadly,

we

expectanotheryearofgrowthoutperformanceacrossmostoftheeconomieswe

cover.

We

forecast2.6%globalgrowthin2024onanannualaveragebasis,atouch

above

ourestimateofglobalpotentialgrowth(Exhibit

12).Mostnotably,ourforecastscallfor

USgrowthtoagainoutpaceitsDMpeers,withcountry-levelforecastsimplying1.1pp

outperformance(vs.consensus)intheUS,

0.5ppinJapan,0.5ppinCanada,0.3ppinChina,0.3ppin

Australia,and0.2ppintheEuroarea.1ThelatestestimatethattheUSeconomywillenterarecessionasde?nedby

theBusinessCycleDatingCommitteeoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearchinthenext12

monthsis55%intheBloombergsurveyshowninthechartand48%inthelatest

WallStreetJournalsurvey.8November20239GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystExhibit

12:

WeForecast

Above-Consensus

GDP

Growth

in

2024Real

GDP

GrowthAnnual

Average2024..Q4/Q42023..2025..2024GSPotentialGSPercent

Change

yoyGS

Consensus

GS

Consensus

GS

ConsensusUS2.40.5-0.10.90.72.41.90.51.32.05.36.43.12.42.30.5-0.40.80.72.31.90.41.11.85.26.53.02.02.10.90.61.10.71.71.50.51.11.84.86.31.62.11.00.70.50.80.61.41.00.40.61.54.56.11.61.31.91.51.31.31.21.71.11.01.72.44.26.52.41.31.81.51.51.41.22.01.01.32.02.24.56.42.01.21.81.31.01.31.21.81.30.81.42.04.65.72.50.91.81.11.31.10.81.30.91.41.82.64.26.12.12.0Euro

AreaGermanyFranceItalySpainJapanUKCanadaAustraliaChinaIndiaBrazilRussiaWorld2.72.52.62.12.72.72.62.5Note:Allforecastscalculatedoncalendaryearbasisexceptwhenotherwisestated.IMF

forecastsusedforIndia2025consensuswhenquartersnotavailableinBloomberg.TheglobalgrowthaggregatesusemarketFXcountry

weights.Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchTherearefourmainreasonsforouroptimismongrowth.The?rstreasonisourconstructiveoutlookforrealdisposableincomegrowthinanenvironmentofmuchlowerheadlinein?ationandstill-stronglabormarkets.

AlthoughweexpectUSrealincomegrowthtoslowfromtheoutsized4%paceseenin2023to2?%in2024,thisshouldstillbesuf?cienttosupportconsumptionandGDPgrowthofatleast2%.

Meanwhile,boththeEuroareaandtheUKshouldseeameaningfulaccelerationinrealincomegrowth—toaround2%by

end-2024—astheRussiangasshock

fades(Exhibit

13).Exhibit

13:

Continued

Real

Income

Strength

in

the

US

and

a

Pickup

in

EuropeSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThesecondreasonisthatwhilemonetaryand?scalpolicywilllikelyweighongrowthacrosstheG10,

thebiggestdragisbehindus.

Aswehaveshownrepeatedly,themaximumimpactofmonetarytighteningonthegrowthrate(asopposedtolevel)of8November202310GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystGDPoccurswithashortandreasonablypredictablelagofabouttwoquarters.

Wethereforeexpectasmallerdragfromtighter?nancialconditionsin2024thanin2023,evenafterfactoringintherecentincreaseinlong-terminterestrates.Weestimatethat?scalpolicywillsubtract0.2ppfromglobalgrowthin2024,withonlyaslightlylarger0.3ppdraginDMs.

ThedragislikelytobesmallintheUSbecausemostpandemic-relatedstimulushasalreadyendedand?scalconsolidationisunlikelytostartinapresidentialelectionyear.

ItshouldbelargerintheUK(whereanelectionalsoloomsbuttheenergycrisissupportwillneverthelessrolloff)andinSouthernEurope(whichwilllikelyseetheendofenergy-relatedpaymentsandapullbackinEURecoveryFund

spending).

Ourcombinedmonetaryand?scalimpulseestimateissettofadedespitemodest?scalheadwinds,however,

andpointstoamaximumpainpointinlate2022(Exhibit

14).Exhibit

14:

A

Manageable

Drag

from

Monetary

and

Fiscal

PolicySource:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThe

thirdreasonisthatmanufacturingactivityshouldrecoversomewhatin2024fromasubdued2023pace.

Weakindustrialactivitythisyearre?ectedacombinationofunusualheadwinds,includingarebalancingofspendingbacktowardsservicesfromgoods,theEuropeanenergycrisis,aninventorydestockingcyclethatcorrectedforanoverbuildin2022,andaweaker-than-expectedreboundinChinesemanufacturing.Mostoftheseheadwindsaresettofadethisyear,

asspendingpatternsnormalize,gas-intensiveEuropeanproduction?ndsatrough,andinventories-to-GDPratiosstabilize,promptingamanufacturingrecoveryback

towardstrendfrombelow(Exhibit15).8November202311GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystExhibit

15:

Gas-Intensive

European

Manufacturing

Is

Finding

a

Trough

and

Inventories

Are

Edging

Back

to

Normal

LevelsSource:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThe

?nalandmostnovel

reasonfor

optimismongrowthisthatbecausecentralbanksdon’tneedarecessiontobringin?ationdown,theywilltryhardtoavoidone.

SeveraloftheEMearlyhikers—includingBrazilandPoland—havealreadybeguntocutpolicyratesfromhighlyrestrictivelevelsandarelikelytodeliverongoingsteadycuts.

WeseelessscopeforpreemptiveeasinginDMeconomies,butthinkDMcentralbankswouldloselittletimebeforepivotingtocutsifthegrowthoutlookdeterioratedmeaningfully.Indeed,ouranalysisofpasthikingcyclescon?rmsthatmajorcentralbanksaretwiceaslikelytocutratesinresponsetodownsidegrowthrisksoncein?ationhasnormalizedtosub-3%ratesrelativetowhenin?ationisabove

5%(Exhibit

16).

Thisisanimportantinsurancepolicyagainstarecession.Exhibit

16:

Central

Banks

Are

More

Willing

to

Pursue

Insurance

Cuts

as

In?ation

CoolsPercentage

points70Percentage

points70Effect

of1ppUnemployment

RateIncreaseonProbability

ofRate

Cut

inFollowing

Quarter,By

Rate

ofInflation60504030201006050403020100<3%3-4%4-5%>5%Year-Over-Year

Inflation

Rate

(Percent)Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch8November202312GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystA

Higher

Policy

Rate

RegimeAlthoughwe

seealower

hurdlefor

ratecutsin2024andsomeEMcentralbanksarealreadypreemptivelyeasingpolicy,

ourbaselineeconomicforecastscallfor

in?ationtoremainmodestlyabove

target,unemploymentratestoremainbelowtheirlong-runlevels,andGDPtogrowataroughlytrendpacein2024.

Soalthoughwe

forecastthatmajorDMcentralbanks(asidefromJapan)are?nishedhiking,ourbaselineforecastimplieslittle

incentivefor

themtocutinterestratesinthenearterm,andwe

donotexpectDMratecutsuntil2024H2barringaweaker-than-expectedgrowthoutcome.AcrossDMcentralbanks,we

expecttheECB,BoE,andBoC

tostartcuttingontheearlierside,probablyin2024Q3butpossiblyeven

earlier.

Thisisbecauseoftheexpectedin?ationprogressintheEuroareaandaweakergrowthoutlookintheUK,andbecauseofareactionfunctionthatputsmoreweightonthelevel

ofthepolicyraterelativetoneutralinCanada.

Bycontrast,we

anticipatethatgrowthoutperformanceintheUSwilllessentheurgencytolower

ratesanddelaythe?rstratecutuntil2024Q4,while?rmin?ationshouldkeep

Australiaonholduntil2024Q4aswell.

Within?ationstillmodestlyabove

of?cialtargets,centralbanksarelikelytoproceedcautiouslyafterinitiatingtheirrate-cuttingcycles,andinallcaseswe

forecastonlyagradualnormalizationata25bpperquarterpace(Exhibit

17).Exhibit

17:

Cuts

Are

Coming

Sooner

(in

EM)

or

Later

(in

DM)Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchWhenpolicyratesultimatelydosettle,we

expectcentralbankstoleave

themabove

thelong-runsustainablelevelstheycurrentlyproject.

Weareraisingourlong-runpolicyrateforecastsby50bpinmajorDMsto3.5-3.75%intheUS,2.5%intheEuroarea,3%intheUK,and3.5%inbothCanadaand

Australia,withsimilarupgradesinothereconomies.Themostimportantdriverofthisforecastchangeisourlongstandingviewthattheneutralrateisapoorlyidenti?edconcept,andthatchangesin?nancialconditionsaremoreusefulindeterminingtheappropriatestanceofpolicy.

As

labormarkets8November202313GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystrebalance,growthisaroundpotential,andin?ationnormalizesback

totarget,manycentralbankswillseetheargumentfor

furthereasingasrelativelyweak,especiallywhencomingfromabove.

Andifeconomiesdoprove

resilientwithpolicyratesatelevatedlevels,somecentralbankscouldreevaluatetheirestimatesoflonger-run

ratesandconcludethat,inretrospect,thedowngradesduringthepost-2008cyclewereexcessive.Severaleconomicfundamentalsalsoargueforhigherlonger-run

ratesgoingforward.First,globalgovernmentde?citsarelikelytoremainelevateddespiteincremental?scalconsolidation.

Second,higherinvestmentthiscycle—whethertofacilitatethetransitionto

“netzero”

orthewidespreadadoptionofgenerative

AI—couldalsoputupwardpressureonnear-term

equilibriuminterestrates.Finally,

theproductivityboostspromisedbygenerative

AI—whichrecentlypromptedustoupgradeourlonger-rungrowthforecastsby

0.4ppintheUS,

0.3ppinotherDMs,and0.2ppinadvancedEMs—couldputupwardpressureonrates,especiallyifthegenerative

AIadoptiontimelineismorefrontloaded(Exhibit

18).Exhibit

18:

Elevated

De?cits

and

the

Widespread

Adoption

of

Generative

AI

Should

Support

Higher

Long-Term

RatesSource:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch8November202314GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystThe

Bank

of

Japan

ExitsAmongDMeconomies,Japanstandsapartbecausethein?ationpickup

was

largelydesired.

After

threedecadesofanemicpricepressuresoroutrightde?ation,thestrong2023shuntowageroundsignaledthattheBoJ

was

movingtowardsitsgoalofestablishingavirtuouscyclebetweenwagesandprices.

HealingglobalsupplychainsimplythatsomemoderationinJapanesein?ation—whichby

allmeasuresiscurrentlyabove

2%—islikelyinthepipeline,butunderlyingservicesin?ationislikelytoremain?rmagainstastrongerlabormarketbackdrop(Exhibit

19,leftpanel).TheBoJisthereforepoisedtostartmovingtowardanexitfromyieldcurvecontrolinApril2024,beginningwithapivottoatighteningbiasandafurtherincreaseinthe10-year

referenceratefollowingalikelyevenstrongerspringshunto(Exhibit

19,rightpanel).

AformalabandonmentofthepolicyisunlikelyuntilOctober,

onceservicesin?ationdatahascrediblyvalidatedthatanestablishedwage-pricelinkageislikelytokeepin?ationneartargetfor

theforeseeablefuture.

Evenso,Japanesein?ationshouldremainfar

belowwhatitsG10

peershave

experiencedthiscycle,andwe

thereforeexpectonlyamodestpaceofratehikes(withthedepositratereachingjust0.25%bytheendof2025).Exhibit

19:

Japanese

In?ation

May

Fall

Back

to

the

Target,

But

the

BoJ’sEyes

Are

on

the

ShuntoPercent,

year

agoJapan

CPIInflationPercent,

year

ago

Percent,

year

agoShunto

Base

Pay

RaisePercent,

year

ago3.0663.02.52.01.51.00.5Headline5452024

(GSForecast):2.5%New

Core*2.52.01.51.00.50.0WesternCore**Core

Services***433BoJ

Inflation

Target221100-1-2-3-1-2GSForecast-3

0.0199220192020202120222023202420252026199720022007201220172022*CPIex.freshfood

andenergy.**CPIex.foodandenergy.***Services

CPIex.rentanddining.Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch8November202315GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsAnalystTemporary

Relief

From

China’s

Multi-Year

SlowdownChina’s

reopeningreboundin2023provedsomewhatdisappointing(although2023growthissettooutperformbothourandconsensusforecastsfromlastfall),anditsmulti-yearpropertyslowdownhascontinuedtobitein2023.

Still,growthinChinahaspickedupmodestlyinrecentmonthsandshouldbene?tfromfurtherpolicystimulusinthenearterm.

WeexpectChina’s

GDPgrowthtoslowto4.8%in2024astheeasygainsfromreopeningfadeintorearview,

butsupportedby

aslightlysmallerhousingdrag,amodestreboundinglobaltrade,andadditionalpolicyeasingthatshouldbefrontloadedinH1(Exhibit

20).Exhibit

20:

Growth

in

China

Should

Slow

as

Reopening

Runs

Its

Course,

Despite

a

Boost

from

Policy

EasingPercent,year

agoContributions

toChinaRealGDP

GrowthPercent,year

agoPercentage

points,annualrateChin