從“防范”到“遏制”：被安全化的美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)政策研究報(bào)告

2022NO.6(總第56期)復(fù)旦發(fā)展研究院復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地復(fù)旦大學(xué)國家發(fā)展與智能治理綜合實(shí)驗(yàn)室從“防范”到“遏制”：被安全化的美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)政策研究報(bào)告網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地旦大學(xué)國家發(fā)展與智能治理綜合實(shí)驗(yàn)室沈逸莫非旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地主任復(fù)旦大學(xué)國際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院博士研究生復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地科研助理研究》(17ZDA106)的階段性成果復(fù)旦大學(xué)發(fā)展研究院副研究員、復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地主任助理姚旭學(xué)發(fā)展研究院青年副研究員復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地助理研究員復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地特邀研究員復(fù)旦大學(xué)發(fā)展研究院在職博士后、上海開放大學(xué)助理研究員復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地辦公室主任復(fù)旦大學(xué)國際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院本科生教學(xué)秘書學(xué)院博士研究生復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地技術(shù)主管復(fù)旦大學(xué)國際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院博士研究生復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地科研助理宮云牧復(fù)旦大學(xué)國際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院博士研究生2復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地科研助理復(fù)旦大學(xué)國際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院博士研究生復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地科研助理復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地科研助理 (一)警惕階段：重點(diǎn)打壓中國軍事技術(shù)的發(fā)展 6(二)防范階段：著手打壓中國電信技術(shù)的推廣 8(三)遏制階段：全面打壓中國先進(jìn)技術(shù)的超越 10 (一)中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加速了美國對(duì)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的“安全化” 16(二)中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)被“簡(jiǎn)單化”，美國將半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)塑造為對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的抓手 20(三)先進(jìn)半導(dǎo)體被“符號(hào)化”，成為美國釋放對(duì)華安全焦慮的出口 26 (一)拜登政府的半導(dǎo)體戰(zhàn)略違背全球半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展規(guī)律，且美國國內(nèi)缺乏充分的半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)基礎(chǔ)的支撐 29(二)美國在半導(dǎo)體聯(lián)盟中的影響力，不足以促使盟伴在“美國優(yōu)先”的前提下，以“自掏腰包”的方式追隨拜登政府的半導(dǎo)體戰(zhàn)略 31(三)拜登政府對(duì)華半導(dǎo)體制造能力“過度封鎖”的傾向，不符合盟友及設(shè)備供應(yīng)商的利益 33 1代化之外，美國開始逐步防范中國科技企業(yè)所謂的“網(wǎng)絡(luò)間諜”與“網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊”戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的框架下，進(jìn)一步明確將“美國對(duì)華的科技優(yōu)勢(shì)”納入了“國家安全”先動(dòng)政府更好的完成美國自身特定戰(zhàn)略資源的整合和完善。由此，“半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)”戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的抓手。眼下，拜登政府的半導(dǎo)體戰(zhàn)略呈現(xiàn)出“弱他”與“自強(qiáng)”并重的“兩面性”2特今天的美國已經(jīng)不具備三十年前的曾經(jīng)擁有過的壓倒性的國家實(shí)力與戰(zhàn)略芯帶來的客觀后果。3終難以實(shí)質(zhì)性的達(dá)成美國預(yù)設(shè)的宏大戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)。2.中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)帶來的霸權(quán)地位失落誘發(fā)的國家安全焦慮加劇了美國在認(rèn)重要的判定依據(jù)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。4加“簡(jiǎn)單化”的認(rèn)定只要通過一系列政策就能在較短時(shí)間內(nèi)以較低成本“成功”5也越發(fā)負(fù)面，從“防范”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤懊撱^”。境。制的焦點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域。6(一)警惕階段：重點(diǎn)打壓中國軍事技術(shù)的發(fā)展za布什政府的國家情報(bào)總監(jiān)(DirectorofNationalIntelligence)約翰·內(nèi)格羅蓬特 (JohnNegroponte)在向參議院情報(bào)特別委員會(huì)(SenateSelectCommitteeOne1“RicewarnsChinaoverbuildupofitsmilitary,”theSeattleTimes,March16,2005.https://www.seattletimescomnationworldricewarnschinaoverbuildup-of-its-military/2JohnNegroponte,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligencefortheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceFebruaryhttpswwwdnigovfilesdocumentsNewsroomTestimonies/20060202_testimony.pdf3QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,February6,2006./Portals/70/Documents/q7度專業(yè)化電信設(shè)備等。4使其對(duì)NationalSecurityAgency號(hào)為“Shotgiant”的行SenateArmedServicesCommittee式處理器和控制器等)以獲取情報(bào)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。74“RevisionsandClarificationofExportandReexportControlsforthePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC);NewAuthorizationValidatedEnd-User;RevisionofImportCertificateandPRCEnd-UserStatementReqisterJunehttpswwwfederalregistergovdocumentsErevisionsandclarificationofexportandreexportcontrols-for-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc5EvanMedeirosetal.,ANewDirectionforChina’sDefenseIndustry(Arlington,VA:RANDCorporation,2005),pp.217-218.NSABreachedChineseServersSeenasSecurityThreat,”March22,2014./2/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html7MichaelMcConnell,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheIntelligenceCommunityfortheSenateArmedServicesCommitteeFebruaryhttpswwwdnigovfilesdocumentsNewsroomTestimonies20080227_testimony.pdf8(二)防范階段：著手打壓中國電信技術(shù)的推廣進(jìn)斷增加。82011年10月，美國國家反間諜執(zhí)行局(OfficeoftheNational美國知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)與經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，對(duì)國家安全最具“侵略性”的經(jīng)濟(jì)間諜(economic8DennisBlair,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheIntelligenceCommunityfortheSenateArmedServicestteeMarchhttpswwwdnigovfilesdocumentsNewsroomTestimoniestestimonypdf9/sites/default/files/article/attachments/us-counterintelligence-2011-foreign-spies-stealing-us-economic-secrets-cyberspace.pdf10/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20120216_SASC%20Final%20Unclassified%20-%202012%20ATA%20SFR.pdf;/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/2013_03_12_SSCI_Worldwide_Threat_Assessment.pdf;/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTASFRSSCIJanpdfhttpswwwdnigovfilesdocumentsUnclassifiedATASFR_-_ShttpswwwdnigovfilesdocumentsSASCUnclassifiedATASFRFINALpdf11MikeRogers,DutchRuppersberger,“InvestigativeReportontheU.S.NationalSecurityIssuesPosedbyChineseTelecommunicationsCompaniesHuaweiandZTE,”Washington,DC,October8,2012.https://re/sites//files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf9國投資委員會(huì)(CFIUS)出于所謂的年7月，摩托羅拉公司(MotorolaInc.)在美國伊利諾伊州北區(qū)地方法院對(duì)華為政部部長(zhǎng)蒂莫西?蓋特納(TimothyGeithner)、商務(wù)部部款法案》(H.R.933)。17該法案的第516條(Sec.516)規(guī)定，美國商務(wù)部和司法BruceEinhornHuaweisBusinessDealFlopsBusinessWeekFebruary21,2008.14“CommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates(CFIUS)ConcernsCausePartiestoAbandonTransactionJuly2010./insights/publications/committee-on-foreign-investment-intheunitedstates-cfius-concerns-cause-parties-to-abandon-transaction-july-7-201015“MotorolasuesHuaweifortradesecrettheft,”July222010./article/us-motorolahuaweiidUSTRELJ00722HINA010082517“StatementbythePressSecretaryonH.R.933”,March26,2013./thepressoffice03/26/statement-press-secretary-hr-933，閾下的中美關(guān)系日益消極，20而美國國內(nèi)對(duì)華科技實(shí)力及相關(guān)企業(yè)的態(tài)度(三)遏制階段：全面打壓中國先進(jìn)技術(shù)的超越冷戰(zhàn)后對(duì)華實(shí)施流動(dòng)策略所期待的。21即，結(jié)束對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略接觸以及放棄“塑造”18/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/933/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22HR93CHR33%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=219TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategy,February2015,p.4.https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2015.pdf.21DanBlumenthal,“TheThreeWaysWeGetChinaandItsNeighborsWrong,”/articles/danblumenthal/three-ways-get-china-neighbors-wrong/;SteinRingen,“HowtheWestgotChinawrong,”/comment/insight-opinion/article/2023935/how-west-got-china-wronges仍然是經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事的核心，但由于技術(shù)高原和其他國家的投資，新一代半導(dǎo)體 特希澤(RobertLighthizer)發(fā)送行政備忘錄(82FR39007)，指示其調(diào)查中國可并稱中國通過網(wǎng)絡(luò)間諜及其他惡意行為竊取美國的專有技術(shù)和早期階段的創(chuàng)新國全方位的科技打壓。rtfoundationaltechnologies)的出口管制，旨在補(bǔ)充被美國政府認(rèn)為對(duì)國家安全至22DanielCoats,StatementfortheRecordWorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheUSIntelligenceCommunitySenateArmedServicesCommitteeMayhttps///files/documents/Newsroom/TestimRFINALPDF23FederalRegister/Vol.82,No.163/Thursday,August24,2017./sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/FRN%20China301.pdf24TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,December2017,p.25,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf.管制清單”(CommerceControlList)中增加離散微波晶體管(discretemicrowavetransistors商務(wù)部工業(yè)與安全局宣2550U.S.C.§4817(a)(b);ECRA§1758(a)(b).26“BISAnnouncesReviewofEmergingTechnologyControlsandSeeksPublicComment,”Novermber20,2018./bis-announces-review-of-emerging-technology-controls-and-sbliccommenthttpswwwfederalregistergovdocumentsreviewofcontrols-for-certain-emerging-technologieshttpswwwfederalregistergovdocumentsimplementationofcertainnewcontrols-onmergingtechnologiesagreedatwassenaararrangementhttpswwwfederalregistergovdocuments1625/implementation-of-the-february-2020-austragroupintersessionaldecisionsadditionofcertaintpswwwfederalregistergovdocumentsimplementationofcertainnewcontrolsonmergingtechnologiesagreedatwassenaararrangement資產(chǎn)管理辦公室(OFAC)許可的情況下向伊朗發(fā)送了美國禁運(yùn)的技術(shù)設(shè)備，違單”外，又再一次針對(duì)華節(jié)點(diǎn)(包括極紫外光技術(shù))的產(chǎn)品或技術(shù)。35FYNDAA)，該法案的第1656條(Sec.1656)禁止華為的設(shè)備和服務(wù)進(jìn)入美國的國防電信網(wǎng)絡(luò);36而2018年8月，其簽署的“2019財(cái)年國防授權(quán)法” (FY2019NDAA)的第889條，則進(jìn)一步禁止所有的美國聯(lián)邦行政機(jī)構(gòu)系統(tǒng)采ntsadditionofentitiestotheentitylisthttpswwwfederalregistergovdocuments21/2019-17921/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-listandrevision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list33U.S.DepartmentofCommerc,“CommerceAddressesHuawei’sEffortstoUndermineEntityList,RestrictsProductsDesignedandProducedwithU.S.Technologies,”https://2017-2021./news/press-releases/commerce-addresses-huaweis-efforts-undermine-entity-list-restricts.html34U.S.DepartmentofCommerc,“CommerceDepartmentFurtherRestrictsHuaweiAccesstoU.S.TechnologyandAddsAnother38AffiliatestotheEntityList,”https://2017-2021./news/press-releases08/commerce-department-further-restricts-huawei-access-us-technology-and.html35/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revisionofentryontheentitylistand-removal-of-entities36/bill/115th-congress/housebill/2810?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22FY2018+NDAAC22FY2018%22%2C%22NDAA%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1委員會(huì)(CFIUS)的管轄權(quán)限，要求對(duì)中美之間涉及關(guān)鍵技術(shù)、關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、委員會(huì)以數(shù)據(jù)安全為由，阻止螞蟻金服收購美國金融科技公司速匯金 普專門發(fā)布了兩道行政命令，也是以國家安全為由，禁止美國公司或個(gè)人與中37/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22FY2018+NDAA2%2C%22FY2018%22%2C%22NDAA%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=238“CFIUSBlocksAlibaba’sAttemptedAcquisitionofMoneyGram,CitingDataSafetyConcerns,”January2,2018./cfius-blocks-alibabas-attempted-acquisition-moneygram-citing-data-safetyconcerns39“HowGrindrbecameanationalsecurityissue,”March28,2019./article/us-grindrmabeijingkunlunidUSKCNSJ28N0https://2017-2021./the-clean-network/index.htmlistergovdocumentsaddressingthethreatposedbytiktokandtaking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency;/documents/2020/08/11dressingthethreatposedbywechatandtakingadditionalstepstoaddressthenationalemergency而今，拜登政府繼承了特朗普?qǐng)?zhí)政時(shí)期美國在關(guān)鍵與新興技術(shù)領(lǐng)域?qū)θA的打壓與強(qiáng)化美國本土產(chǎn)業(yè)基礎(chǔ)、供應(yīng)鏈韌性等政策目標(biāo)相互捆綁、并行推進(jìn)。 (whole-of-governmentapproach)評(píng)估關(guān)鍵供應(yīng)鏈的脆弱性以及加強(qiáng)關(guān)鍵供應(yīng)鏈著43TheWhiteHouse,“Biden-HarrisAdministrationAnnouncesSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForcetoAressShortTermSupplyChainDiscontinuitieshttpswwwwhitehousegovbriefingroomstatementsreleases/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-shttermsupplychaindiscontinuities44TheWhiteHouse,“Biden-HarrisAdministrationAnnouncesSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForcetoAressShortTermSupplyChainDiscontinuitieshttpswwwwhitehousegovbriefingroomstatementsreleases/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-shttermsupplychaindiscontinuities45TheWhiteHouse,“TheBiden-HarrisPlantoRevitalizeAmericanManufacturingandSecureCriticalSupplyChainsin2022,”/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/24/the-biden-harris-plan-to-revitalize-american-manufacturing-and-secure-critical-supply-chains-in-2022/業(yè)變革的關(guān)鍵時(shí)期，涉華脅迫的有力支撐。(一)中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加速了美國對(duì)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的“安全化”。specialization)、企業(yè)間高度相互依存的結(jié)構(gòu)。美國半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)(SIA)與波數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)涉及數(shù)字產(chǎn)業(yè)化、產(chǎn)業(yè)數(shù)字化兩大部分。前者涉及電子信息制造業(yè)、信息通信業(yè)、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)行業(yè)士頓咨詢集團(tuán)(BCG)估算，在整個(gè)“半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)”的供應(yīng)鏈中，至少有50個(gè)節(jié)點(diǎn)主要依賴單一區(qū)域來源的供應(yīng)。例如，硅片(Siliconwafers)、光刻膠 體產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的增加值占比中位列首位，達(dá)38%；而美國的無晶圓廠企業(yè)(Fabless)與集成器件制造商(IDM)更是合計(jì)占全球半導(dǎo)體銷售份額的近一半。47但是，nmnm的半導(dǎo)體制造代工能力，美國的生產(chǎn)份額又將至個(gè)位47芯片類型的供應(yīng)商有三類：集設(shè)計(jì)、制造、封裝和市場(chǎng)銷售為一體的公司，為集成器件制造商(IDM)；為其他芯片供應(yīng)商制造電路芯片，稱為代工廠(Foundry)；做設(shè)計(jì)和晶圓市場(chǎng)的公司，其從晶圓工廠購買ant48ICInsights,GlobalWaferCapacity2020-2024,February13,2020,p.1./services/global-wafer-capacity/report-contents/.EUSSEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYSIAhttpswwwsemiconductorsorgstateoftheus-semiconductor-industry/家安全造成風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。tz可信集成電路戰(zhàn)略”(DefenseTrustedIntegratedCircuitStrategy)，稱美國需要可為保障國防工業(yè)的技術(shù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，美國軍方選擇將“單一來源的可信代工模式”STRENGTHENINGTHEGLOBALSEMICONDUCTORSUPPLYCHAININANUNCERTAINERA,”wsemiconductorsorgstrengtheningtheglobalsemiconductorsupplychaininanuncertainera/51CRS,U.S.SemiconductorManufacturing:IndustryTrends,GlobalCompetition,FederalPolicy,https://crsreportscongressgovproductpdfRR8152DepartmentofDefense,DefenseScienceBoardTaskForceonHighPerformanceMicrochipSupply,December2005,pp.96./sti/pdfs/ADA435563.pdf53KirstenBaldwin,PolicyPerspective:TheCurrentandProposedSecurityFramework,DepartmentofDefense,August16,2016,p.12.54KristenBaldwin,Long-TermStrategyforDODAssuredMicroelectronicsNeedsandInnovationforNationalEconomicCompetitiveness,DOD,October24,2018,p.19.https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapinetndia2018/systems/Wed_21335_Baldwin.pdf科技實(shí)力優(yōu)勢(shì)。協(xié)同合奏”提供重要支持。562020年10月特朗普政府發(fā)布了“關(guān)鍵和新興技術(shù)國家戰(zhàn)略”(NationalStrategyforCriticalandhttpswwwsemiconductorsorgstrengtheningtheglobalsemiconductorsupplychaininanuncertainera56技術(shù)革命浪潮的增長(zhǎng)效能由其在連接+能源+材料三重維度的技術(shù)變遷及其所形成的凈創(chuàng)造效應(yīng)所決定。革命浪潮中，最先實(shí)現(xiàn)信息+能源+材料三重維度協(xié)同“合奏”的國家，則會(huì)成為新一輪技術(shù)技術(shù)領(lǐng)域。572022年2月拜登政府的國家科學(xué)技術(shù)委員會(huì)(NSTC)發(fā)布了新版(二)中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)被“簡(jiǎn)單化”，美國將半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)塑造為對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)57TheWhiteHouse,“NationalStrategyforCriticalandEmergingTechnologies,”https://trumpwhitehouse.archivesgovwpcontentuploads2020/10/National-Strategy-for-CET.pdf58NSTC,“CRITICALANDEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESLISTUPDATE,”February2022.https://wwwwhitehousegovwpcontentuploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdfPCASTEnsuringLongTermUSLeadershipinSemiconductorsJanuary.https://obamawhitehous/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf60CRS,Semiconductors:U.S.Industry,GlobalCompetition,andFederalPolicy,October26,2020.https://crsreportscongressgovproductpdfRR581中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)走向的，是各自的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)能與治理能力。及半導(dǎo)體對(duì)新一輪技術(shù)創(chuàng)新與產(chǎn)業(yè)變革的非凡價(jià)值，在這四大因素的共同促使62JosephBiden,“WhyAmericaMustLeadAgain–RescuingU.S.ForeignPolicyAfterTrump,”http://deutschchinesischesforumdeimages/thinktank/20201114/Why%20America%20Must%20Lead%20Again.pdf片核心技術(shù)和高端研發(fā)的控制、對(duì)主要半導(dǎo)體企業(yè)融資渠道和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的控制、作為世界芯片國內(nèi)層面——?jiǎng)?chuàng)造產(chǎn)業(yè)激勵(lì)措施”。 (LindseyGraham)發(fā)起了“修復(fù)關(guān)鍵供應(yīng)鏈和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)法”(RestoringCriticalAct美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的條款，在后續(xù)“2021美國創(chuàng)新與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法案”(UnitedStates/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3832?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.+3832%CSCD%7D&s=3&r=6；/bill/116th-congress/house-bill978?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr6978%22%2C%22hr6978%22%5D%7D&s=4&r=2pswwwgovtrackuscongressbillsspswwwgovtrackuscongressbillsshttpswwwcongressgovbillthcongresssenatebillefenseFundand億美元給“美國勞動(dòng)力與教育芯片基金”(CHIPSforAmericaWorkforceand抵動(dòng)力。若將拜登政府強(qiáng)化對(duì)華半導(dǎo)體制造技術(shù)的封鎖視為維持美國既有的“控制半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的依賴性，進(jìn)而為脅迫性手段的實(shí)施提供可持續(xù)的戰(zhàn)略籌碼。pswwwgovtrackuscongressbillshr2.國際層面——發(fā)揮集體競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)拜登政府試圖將半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)部署在具有相同價(jià)值觀的“友好國的地區(qū)分工網(wǎng)絡(luò)。造業(yè)，并促進(jìn)廣泛增長(zhǎng)》(BuildingResilientSupplyChains,RevitalizingAmericanManufacturing,andFosteringBroad-BasedGrowth)中指出，美國不具有資源應(yīng)對(duì)體戰(zhàn)略利益的半導(dǎo)體供應(yīng)鏈體系，而非以商業(yè)利益最大化為原則重塑半導(dǎo)體供69/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf“美國半導(dǎo)體聯(lián)盟”。t拜登與七國集團(tuán)(G7)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人宣布啟動(dòng)“全球基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和投資伙伴關(guān)系” rdsCooperationNetwork71TheWhiteHouse,“ADeclarationfortheFutureoftheInternet,”/wp-contentuploads/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version_FINAL.pdf72/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-ladersformallylaunchthepartnershipforglobalinfrastructureandinvestment3/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-autraliaunitedkingdomunitedstatespartnershipaukus74/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/quad-principles-on-technology-designdevelopmentgovernanceandusehttpswwwwhitehousegovbriefingroomstatementsreleases2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/Chip業(yè)上、中、下游及不聯(lián)盟。(三)先進(jìn)半導(dǎo)體被“符號(hào)化”，成為美國釋放對(duì)華安全焦慮的出口 WIPO頭發(fā)布的全球創(chuàng)新指數(shù)顯示，自中國戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以來，面對(duì)美國的脫76/documents/2022/04/06/2022-07211/request-for-public-comments-on-supply-chain-issues-to-support-the-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council#:~:text=With%20regard%20to%20semiconductors%2C%20on%20September%2029%2C%202021%2C,the%20supply%20chain%20through%20diversification%20and%20increased%20investment.77WIPO,“GlobalInnovationIndex2021,”/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2021/cn.pdf78AvrilHaines,ANNUALTHREATASSESSMENTOFTHEU.S.INTELLIGENCECOMMUNITY,FebruaryhttpswwwodnigovfilesODNIdocumentsassessmentsATAUnclassifiedReport.pdf杠桿，讓美國贏得時(shí)間采取力所能及的措施確保其技術(shù)的領(lǐng)先。對(duì)華具有絕對(duì)領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢(shì)、在全球具彰顯SammSacks,“China:ChallengestoU.S.Commerce,”/services/files/710EDED0-4DDC-998E-B99B2D19449A80/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdfJonBatemanUSChinaTechnological“Decoupling”:AStrategyandPolicyFramework,PublishedApril25,2022./2022/04/25/u.s.-china-technological-decoupling-strategy-and-policy-framework-pub-86897以顯示自身依舊對(duì)華具有相當(dāng)?shù)膽?zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)和脅迫能力。的計(jì)(一)拜登政府的半導(dǎo)體戰(zhàn)略違背全球半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展規(guī)律，且美國國內(nèi)缺乏充分的半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)基礎(chǔ)的支撐際合作這五個(gè)方面的共同努力。83從目前的路徑看，美國主要是通過聯(lián)邦撥款，hicspecialization83GAO,SemiconductorSupplyChain:PolicyConsiderationsfromSelectedExpertsforReducingRisksatagesJulhttpswwwgaogovproductsgaotpswwwsemiconductorsorgstrengtheningtheglobalsemiconductorsupplychaininanuncertaineraPSISTSPpdfhttpswwwcnasorgpublicationsreportsrewiresemiconductorsandusindustrial-policy間，美國所有行業(yè)的先進(jìn)制造業(yè)工作崗位在私營部門中的比例從7.5%下降到回、(二)美國在半導(dǎo)體聯(lián)盟中的影響力，不足以促使盟伴在“美國優(yōu)先”的前拜登政府將美國的盟友、伙伴視為最大的戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)，并著力通過“陣營化”httpswwwdefensegovNewsReleasesReleaseArticle72854/dod-releases-industrial-capabilities-report/88/sites/default/files/2022-02/ICT%20Supply%20Chain%20Report_2.pdf89WillHunt,RemcoZwetsloot,TheChipmakers:U.S.StrengthsandPrioritiesfortheHigh-EndSemiconductorWorkforceSeptemberhttpswwwsemiconductorsorgwpcontentuploads/10/The-ChipmakersSIA-slides41-Read-Only.pdf體技術(shù)交易與代工合作。市連開工，該項(xiàng)目包括建設(shè)一座新的晶圓工廠。對(duì)于美國正著手組建的“CHIP4”勞。臺(tái)積電前法務(wù)長(zhǎng)、現(xiàn)美國科技企業(yè)Nantero獨(dú)立董事杜東佑(RichardL益技術(shù)、制造設(shè)備的出