風險管理外文翻譯

1、外文文獻翻譯譯文一、外文原文原文：Risk ManagementThis chapter reviews and discusses the basic issues and principles of risk management, including: risk acceptability (tolerability); risk reduction and the ALARP principle; cautionary and precautionary principles. And presents a case study showing the importance of th

2、ese issues and principles in a practical management context. Before we take a closer look, let us briefly address some basic features of risk management.The purpose of risk management is to ensure that adequate measures are taken to protect people, the environment, and assetsfrom possible harmful co

3、nsequencesof the activities being undertaken, as well as to balance different concerns, in particular risks and costs. Risk management includes measures both to avoid the hazards and to reduce their potential harm. Traditionally, in industries such as nuclear, oil, and gas, risk managementwas based

4、on a prescriptive regulating regime, in which detailed requirements were set with regard to the design and operation of the arrangements. This regime has gradually been replaced by a more goal-oriented regime, putting emphasis on what to achieve rather than on the means of achieving it.Risk manageme

5、nt is an integral aspect of a goal-oriented regime. It is acknowledged that risk cannot be eliminated but must be managed. There is nowadays an enormous drive and enthusiasm in various industries and in society as a whole to implement risk managementin organizations. There are high expectations that

6、 risk management is the proper framework through which to achieve high levels of performance.Risk managementinvolves achieving an appropriate balance between realizing opportunities for gain and minimizing losses. It is an integral part of good management practice and an essential element of good co

7、rporate governance. It is aniterative process consisting of steps that, when undertaken in sequence, can lead to a continuous improvement in decision-making and facilitate a continuous improvement in performance.To support decision-making regarding design and operation, risk analyses are carried out

8、. They include the identification of hazards and threats, cause analyses, consequenceanalyses, and risk descriptions. The results are then evaluated. The totality of the analyses and the evaluations are referred to as risk assessments. Risk assessment is followed by risk treatment, which is a proces

9、s involving the development and implementation of measures to modify the risk, including measures designed to avoid, reduce (" optimizer, or Xetlrainstfee risk. Risk transfer meanssharing with another party the benefit or loss associatedwith a risk. It is typically affected through insurance. R

10、isk management covers all coordinated activities in the direction and control of an organization with regard to risk.In many enterprises, the risk management tasks are divided into three main categories: strategic risk, financial risk, and operational risk. Strategic risk includes aspects and factor

11、s that are important for the enterprise -term strateg y ariongans, for example mergers and acquisitions, technology, competition, political conditions, legislation and regulations, and labor market. Financial risk includes the enterprise financial situation, and includes: Market risk, associated wit

12、h the costs of goods and services, foreign exchange rates and securities (shares, bonds, etc.). Credit risk, associatedwith a debtor 'failure to meet its obligations in accordancewith agreed terms. Liquidity risk, reflecting lack of access to cash; the difficulty of selling an asset in a timely

13、manner. Operational risk is related to conditions affecting the normal operating situation: Accidental events, including failures and defects, quality deviations, natural disasters. Intended acts; sabotage, disgruntled employees, etc. Loss of competence, key personnel. Legal circumstances, associate

14、d for instance, with defective contracts and liability insurance.For an enterprise to become successful in its implementation of risk management, top management needs to be involved, and activities must be put into effect on many levels. Some important points to ensure success are: the establishment

15、 of a strategyfor risk management, i.e., the principles of how the enterprise defines and implements risk management. Should one simply follow the regulatory requirements (minimal requirements), or should one be the“ best in the class " ？ The establishment of a riskmanagement process for the en

16、terprise, i.e. formal processesand routines that the enterprise is to follow. The establishment of management structures, with roles and responsibilities, such that the risk analysis process becomes integrated into the organization. The implementation of analyses and support systems, such as risk an

17、alysis tools, recording systems for occurrences of various types of events, etc. The communication, training, and development of a risk management culture, so that the competence, understanding, and motivation level within the organization is enhanced.Given the above fundamentals of risk management,

18、 the next step is to develop principles and a methodology that can be used in practical decision-making. This is not, however, straightforward. There are a number of challenges and here we address some of these: establishing an informative risk picture for the various decision alternatives, using th

19、is risk picture in a decision-making context. Establishing an informative risk picture means identifying appropriate risk indices and assessments of uncertainties. Using the risk picture in a decision making context means the definition and application of risk acceptance criteria, cost benefit analy

20、ses and the ALARP principle, which states that risk should be reduced to a level which is as low as is reasonably practicable.It is common to define and describe risks in terms of probabilities and expected values. This has, however, been challenged, since the probabilities and expected values can c

21、amouflage uncertainties; the assigned probabilities are conditional on a number of assumptions and suppositions, and they depend on the background knowledge. Uncertainties are often hidden in this background knowledge, and restricting attention to the assigned probabilities can camouflage factors th

22、at could produce surprising outcomes. By jumping directly into probabilities, important uncertainty aspects are easily truncated, and potential surprises may be left unconsidered.Let us, as an example, consider the risks, seen through the eyes of a risk analystin the 1970s, associated with future he

23、alth problems for divers working on offshore petroleum projects. The analyst assigns a value to the probability that a diver would experience health problems (properly defined) during the coming 30 years due to the diving activities. Let us assume that a value of 1 % was assigned, a number based on

24、the knowledge available at that time. There are no strong indications that the divers will experience health problems, but we know today that these probabilities led to poor predictions. Many divers have experienced severe health problems (Avon and Vine, 2007). By restricting risk to the probability

25、 assignments alone, important aspects of uncertainty and risk are hidden. There is a lack of understanding about the underlying phenomena,but the probability assignments alone are not able to fully describe this status.Several risk perspectives and definitions have been proposed in line with this re

26、alization. For example, Avon (2007a, 2008a) defines risk as the two-dimensional combination of events/consequencesand associated uncertainties (will the events occur, what the consequences will be). A closely related perspective is suggested by Avon and Renan (2008a), who define risk associated with

27、 an activity as uncertainty about and severity of the consequencesof the activity, where severity refers to intensity, size, extension, scope and other potential measures of magnitude with respect to something that humans value (lives, the environment, money, etc.). Losses and gains, expressed for e

28、xample in monetary terms or as the number of fatalities, are ways of defining the severity of the consequences.See also Avon and Christensen (2005).In the case of large uncertainties, risk assessments can support decision-making, but other principles, measures, and instruments are also required, suc

29、h as the cautionary/precautionary principles as well as robustness and resilience strategies. An informative decision basis is needed, but it should be far more nuanced than can be obtained by a probabilistic analysis alone. This has been stressed by many researchers, e.g. Apostolicism (1990) and Ap

30、ostolicism and Lemon (2005): qualitative risk analysis (QRA) results are never the sole basis for decision-making. Safety- and security-related decision-making is risk-informed, not risk-based. This conclusion isnot, however, justified merely by referring to the need for addressing uncertainties bey

31、ond probabilities and expected values. The main issue here is the fact that risks need to be balanced with other concerns.When various solutions and measures are to be compared and a decision is to be made, the analysis and assessments that have been conducted provide a basis for such a decision. In

32、 many cases, established design principles and standards provide clear guidance. Compliance with such principles and standards must be among the first reference points when assessingrisks. It is common thinking that risk management processes, and especially ALARP processes, require formal guidelines

33、 or criteria (e.g., risk acceptance criteria and cost-effectiveness indices) to simplify the decision-making. Care must; however, be shown when using this type of formal decision-making criteria, as they easily result in a mechanization of the decision-makingprocess. Suchmechanizationisunfortunate b

34、ecause:Decision-making criteria based on risk-related numbers alone (probabilities and expected values) do not capture all the aspects of risk, costs, and benefits, no method has a precision that justifies a mechanical decision based on whether the result is over or below a numerical criterion. It i

35、s a managerial responsibility to make decisions under uncertainty, and management should be aware of the relevant risks and uncertainties.Apostolicism and Lemon (2005) adopt a pragmatic approach to risk analysis and risk management, acknowledging the difficulties of determining the probabilities of

36、an attack. Ideally, they would like to implement a risk-informed procedure, based on expected values. However, since such an approach would require the use of probabilities that have not been “ rigorously derived they see themselves forced to resort to a more pragmatic approach.This is one possible

37、approach when facing problems of large uncertainties. The risk analyses simply do not provide a sufficiently solid basis for the decision-making process. We argue along the same lines. There is a need for a management review and judgment process. It is necessary to see beyond the computed risk pictu

38、re in the form of the probabilities and expected values. Traditional quantitative risk analyses fail inthis respect. We acknowledge the need for analyzing risk, but question the value added by performing traditional quantitative risk analyses in the case of large uncertainties. The arbitrariness in

39、the numbers produced can be significant, due to the uncertainties in the estimates or as a result of the uncertainty assessmentsbeing strongly dependent on the analysts.It should be acknowledged that risk cannot be accurately expressed using probabilities and expected values. A quantitative risk ana

40、lysis is in many cases better replaced by a more qualitative approach, as shown in the examples above; an approach which may be referred to as a semi-quantitative approach. Quantifying risk using risk indices such as the expected number of fatalities gives an impression that risk can be expressed in

41、 a very precise way. However, in most cases, the arbitrariness is large. In a semi-quantitative approach this is acknowledged by providing a more nuanced risk picture, which includes factors that can cause“surprises " relative toprobabilities and the expected values. Quantification often requir

42、es strong simplifications and assumptions and, as a result, important factors could be ignored or given too little (or too much) weight. In a qualitative or semi-quantitative analysis, a more comprehensive risk picture can be established, taking into account underlying factors influencing risk. In c

43、ontrast to the prevailing use of quantitative risk analyses, the precision level of the risk description is in line with the accuracy of the risk analysis tools. In addition, risk quantification is very resource demanding. One needs to ask whether the resources are used in the best way. We conclude

44、that in many cases more is gained by opening up the way to a broader, more qualitative approach, which allows for considerations beyond the probabilities and expected values.The traditional quantitative risk assessments as seen for example in the nuclear and the oil & gas industries provide a ra

45、ther narrow risk picture, through calculated probabilities and expected values, and we conclude that this approach should be used with care for problems with large uncertainties. Alternative approaches highlighting the qualitative aspects are more appropriate in such cases. A broad risk description

46、is required. This is also the case in the normative ambiguity situations, as the risk characterizations provide a basis for the risk evaluation processes. The main concernis the value judgments, but they should be supported by solid scientific assessments, showing a broad risk picture. If one tries

47、to demonstrate that it is rational to accept risk, on a scientific basis, too narrow an approach to risk has been adopted. Recognizing uncertainty as a main component of risk is essential to successfully implement risk management, for cases of large uncertainties and normative ambiguity.A risk descr

48、iption should cover computed probabilities and expected values, as well as: Sensitivities showing how the risk indices depend on the background knowledge (assumptions and suppositions); Uncertainty assessmentsDescription of the background knowledge, including models and data used.The uncertainty ass

49、essmentsshould not be restricted to standard probabilistic analysis, as this analysis could hide important uncertainty factors. The search for quantitative, explicit approachesfor expressing the uncertainties, even beyond the subjective probabilities, may seem to be a possible way forward. However,

50、such an approach is not recommended. Trying to be precise and to accurately express what is extremely uncertain does not make sense. Instead we recommend a more open qualitative approach to reveal such uncertainties. Some might consider this to be less attractive from a methodological and scientific

51、 point of view. Perhaps it is, but it would be more suited for solving the problem at hand, which is about the analysis and management of risk and uncertainties.Source: Terje Aven. 2010.“Risk Management ” . Risk in Technological Systems, Octp175-198.二、翻譯文章 譯文：風險管理本章回顧和討論風險管理的基本問題和原則，包括：風險可接受性(耐受性)、風

52、險削減和安全風險管理原則、警示和預防原則，并提出了一個研究案例，說明 在實際管理環(huán)境中這些問題和原則的重要性。 這需要我們的深入研究，在此之前， 讓我們簡單談談風險管理的一些基本特征。風險管理的目的是：在現(xiàn)時事件產(chǎn)生有害后果時，及時采取適當?shù)拇胧┮源_ 保人類，環(huán)境和資產(chǎn)的安全，以及平衡人們的不同關注取向，特別是風險和成本。 風險管理包括兩種措施，控制危險源和減少潛在的危害。傳統(tǒng)上，諸如核能，石 油和天然氣產(chǎn)業(yè)，風險管理主要是依靠規(guī)范監(jiān)管制度來管理的， 這項制度對設計 和操作的安排提出了系統(tǒng)性的要求。 但是漸漸的，這一制度已被一項更加標準化 的制度所取代，此制度是強調(diào)要取得的成果而不是如何實現(xiàn)這

53、些成果的手段。風險管理是標準化制度的一個組成部分。風險不能消除，只能加以控制改善， 這是被人們所公認的?，F(xiàn)在有一項具有巨大驅(qū)動力和感召力的措施正應運而生， 它將不同產(chǎn)業(yè)和社會作為一個整體來實施組織風險管理。風險管理是一項適當?shù)?措施，人們對于用它來實現(xiàn)高產(chǎn)值有很大的期望。風險管理包括可認識到的實現(xiàn)增益的機會和損失的最小化，并且在它們之間實現(xiàn)適當?shù)钠胶狻＿@是一個組織構(gòu)成良好有效的管理實踐的基本要素。 這是一個 由遞進步驟組成的反復的過程，按順序進行時，能不斷提高決策正確性并且促進 產(chǎn)值的不斷增長。為了支持決策方面的設計和操作，需要進行風險分析。它們包括危害物和威 脅識別，成因分析，結(jié)果分析和風險

54、描述鑒定，然后評估結(jié)果。所有的分析和評 估將被作為風險評估。其次是風險評估的處理辦法，這是一個過程，涉及開發(fā)和 實施措施來緩和風險，措施包括避免，減少（“優(yōu)化”），轉(zhuǎn)移或保留風險。風險 轉(zhuǎn)移意味著與另一方共同享有利益或承擔由于損失造成的風險。 它最典型的是受 保險的影響。風險管理涵蓋了所有協(xié)調(diào)活動的方向目標和風險組織。在許多企業(yè)中，風險管理的任務分為三大類：戰(zhàn)略風險，財務風險和經(jīng)營風 險。戰(zhàn)略風險包括對于企業(yè)的長期戰(zhàn)略和計劃起重要作用的方面和因素，例如兼并和收購，技術(shù)，競爭，政治環(huán)境，法律和法規(guī)，以及勞工市場。財務風險包括 影響企業(yè)財務狀況的因素，包括：市場風險，商品和服務，外匯匯率和證券的相

55、 關成本（股票，債權(quán)等）；信用風險，與債務人沒有按照其約定的有關條款履行 義務；流動性風險，反映現(xiàn)金缺乏時，及時出售資產(chǎn)的困難。操作風險是有關條 件影響正常工作的情況：意外的事件，包括故障和缺陷，質(zhì)量差，自然災害；預期行為，破壞，心懷不滿的雇員等；喪失競爭力，關鍵人員；與法律環(huán)境下相關 的，例如有缺陷合同及責任保險。一個企業(yè)要成功實施風險管理，需要高層管理人員參與，活動必須落實在許 多層面上。確保成功的要點是一個風險管理戰(zhàn)略的確立，例如企業(yè)如何定義和實 施風險管理的原則。難道僅僅只需遵照監(jiān)管要求（最低要求），或追求“成為最好的”？企業(yè)風險管理過程的建立， 包括企業(yè)貫徹的正式流程和常規(guī)。 建立管

56、理 結(jié)構(gòu)，包括角色和責任分配，這樣，風險分析過程和組織融為一體。分析和支持 系統(tǒng)的實施，如風險工具分析，執(zhí)行，記錄系統(tǒng)各種類型的事件的發(fā)生等。溝通, 培訓和發(fā)展風險管理文化，這樣，組織的能力，理解和動機水平得到增強。實施 了上述風險管理的基礎原則后，下一步是制定可用于實際決策中的原則和方法。 然而，這并不是那么簡單，還有一系列的挑戰(zhàn)，在這里我們列舉其中一些：為不 同的風險選擇建立一個豐富的風險信息平臺，將其運用到風險決策環(huán)境中。這意味著正確認識不確定因素的風險指數(shù)和風險評估。在風險決策方面則意味著接受 風險的定義和準則，成本效益分析和安全風險管理原則， 風險應該降低到實際合 理的最低水平。定義

57、和描述關于風險的概率和預期性價值是常見的現(xiàn)象。然而，這受到了挑戰(zhàn)，因為概率和預期值的不確定性是隱蔽的。 概率的分配都是有條件的基于數(shù)量 的簡單假設和推測，他們依據(jù)的是背景知識。不確定性往往是隱藏在這個背景知 識后面，注意限制性是由于給定的概率而產(chǎn)生的， 這些因素的隱蔽性可能產(chǎn)生令 人驚訝的結(jié)果。直接考慮到了重要的不確定性因素容易被阻隔的可能性，而潛在的驚喜可能會是你不曾考慮到的。讓我們舉一個例子，通過20世紀70年代風險分析師分析海上石油項目工作 的有關潛水員未來健康的問題來考慮風險。該分析師對潛水員在未來30年中將經(jīng)歷的由于潛水活動而產(chǎn)生的健康問題 （正確的定義）分配一個價值概率。讓我 們假

58、設1%勺價值被分配，以當時的知識為基礎是合適的。沒有強烈的跡象表明 潛水員會遇到健康問題，但在今天我們知道這些概率導致了較少的預測。許多潛 水員們已出現(xiàn)了嚴重的健康問題 （Avon和Vine, 2007）。通過限制單獨作業(yè)風險 的概率，不確定性和風險的重要方面被隱藏了。由于對深層次的現(xiàn)象缺乏了解， 單獨作業(yè)的概率不能充分描述這種狀態(tài)。一些危險的觀點和定義已被提出并且已被證實符合這個現(xiàn)實。例如,Avon(2007a, 2008a)把風險定義為事件/后果和相關不確定性的二維組合(將發(fā)生 的事件，后果將是什么)。Avon和Renan (2008a)建議從一個密切相關的角度 將風險定義為有關不確定性活

59、動及其產(chǎn)生的嚴重后果，其嚴重性是指強度，大小，擴展，范圍和其他潛在的關于人類價值(生活，環(huán)境，金錢等)的大小措施。損 失和收益，例如以貨幣形式或死亡人數(shù)表述的，是界定后果的嚴重程度的方法。 另見 Avon 和 Christensen (2005)。在具有較大不確定性的情況下，風險評估可以支持決策，但其他原則，措施 和手段也需要，如警示、預防原則，以及魯棒性和彈性戰(zhàn)略。決策依據(jù)的信息是 必要的，但應比單獨通過概率分析所得到的更加細微化。這一點被許多研究者所強調(diào)，如 Apostolicism(1990)和 Apostolicism 與 Lemon (2005):定性分析(QRA的結(jié)果永遠不是決策的唯一基礎。安全和與安全相關的決策是風險告知， 而不是基于風險的。這個結(jié)論僅僅是通過一些超出預期值的概率的需求來確定 的，是不確切的。這里的主要問題是，風險需要與其他關注相平衡。當各種解決方案和措施被進行比較并作出決定時，分析和已進行的評估提供了這樣一個決定性的依據(jù)，在許多情況下